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stance of monetary policy around the world. One of the key di⁄erences between
systems concerns the extent to which such decisions are made by career central
bankers (insiders) or those outside the central banking fraternity (outsiders).
Some countries operate at one extreme on this spectrum with close control
by central bank insiders or decisions made by politicians. But many locate
somewhere in the middle.
A case in point is the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),
which is studied here. Decisions are delegated to a committee comprising ￿ve
internal members who have full-time executive positions in the Bank and four
external members who are mostly part-time and have no executive responsibili-
ties. Each month all members of the committee are briefed by Bank of England
sta⁄, after which they meet for a private discussion and subsequently vote on
interest rate decisions. The outcome is determined by majority rule and the
votes are subsequently made public.
There are two reasons why the composition of monetary policy committees
could matter for policy. The ￿rst is due to the process of selection ￿ those
who come up as insiders have di⁄erent backgrounds and skills. In the case of
the Bank of England, appointment to the position is also formally di⁄erent for
the internal and external members. The second is due to the incentives that
are faced. External members leave the committee after their terms while the
internal members may be building their careers in central banking. If career
concerns a⁄ect incentives, we would expect this to play out quite di⁄erently for
each group.
This paper looks at the voting patterns of internal and external members
of the MPC to investigate how far there are di⁄erences between insiders and
1outsiders. We make three contributions. First, we assess the extent to which
the Bank of England internally generated forecasts explain the MPC members￿
voting decisions. This is important as generating forecasts on a quarterly basis is
key part of the process used by the Bank of England. The forecast for in￿ ation is
made public in the In￿ ation Report while the output gap forecast is not. Second,
we use a random coe¢ cient method of estimation in which the parameters of the
interest rate rule are allowed, but not required, to be di⁄erent across members.
Third, we ￿nd evidence of some heterogeneity in the intercept, a measure of
experience on the MPC and the interest rate smoothing parameter, but no
signi￿cant di⁄erences in the members￿reaction to the forecasts of in￿ ation and
output gap.
Our paper is related to a growing empirical literature covering the voting
record of the MPC. Petra Gerlach-Kristen (2003 and 2007), Arnab Bhattachar-
jee and Sean Holly (2006), Christopher Spencer (2006a) and Stephen Hansen
and Michael McMahon (2007) assess the extent of dissent among members.
Charlotta Groth and Tracy Wheeler (2007) contrast the frequency of policy
changes at individual and committee levels. Simon Hix, Bjorn Hoyland and
Nick Vivyan (2007) investigate the link between government spending and MPC
appointments. Charles Goodhart (2005) estimates aggregate reaction functions
for the MPC as a whole.
In recent studies, Spencer (2006b), and Alessandro Riboni and Francisco
Ruge-Murcia (2007) o⁄er analyses most similar in spirit to our paper, estimat-
ing individual reaction functions. There are important di⁄erences, however, in
our approach, including the use of the Bank of England in￿ ation and output
gap forecast and the random coe¢ cient estimation method, which explicitly
recognizes the dynamic nature of the panel of the MPC voting record.
21 Speci￿cations and results
This section presents the speci￿cations and the estimates of aggregate and in-
dividual interest rate rules.
1.1 Pooled versus individual policy rules
The rule proposed by John B. Taylor (1993) postulates that the policy rate
responds to deviations of in￿ ation and output from the in￿ ation target and
the potential output. The policy rules employed in the empirical literature are
typically variations of the simple formulation by Taylor.
In line with the current practice in monetary policy making, the central
bank tries to close the gap between targets and targeted variables. Policy is
typically forward-looking in that forecasts rather than current values matter for
the interest rate decision. Consistent with earlier contributions, the movement
in the policy rate necessary to close the gap is assumed to be gradual, in the form
of sequences of small steps in the same direction. Thus, we allow for interest
rate smoothing by introducing the lagged interest rate as a regressor.
This treatment of interest rate smoothing is partly a semantic issue, and
merely re￿ ects an empirical regularity still in search of a de￿nitive explana-
tion. One view is that the lagged dependent variable re￿ ects learning about the
evolution of unobserved states, such as for instance the natural rate of inter-
est.1 Other, not mutually exclusive, views include that interest rate smoothing
captures the Brainard principle of caution in the face of uncertainty about the
structure of the economy or serial correlation in the error terms.
In the context of dynamic heterogeneous panels, Hashem M. Pesaran and
Ron Smith (1995) show that when coe¢ cients di⁄er across groups, the estimates
1As di⁄erent members may have di⁄erent views on the state of the economy, the unobserved
variable rationale for interest rate smoothing corroborates the use of heterogenous policy rules.
3of long-run relationships can be severely biased if the regressors are highly per-
sistent, as they are in our dataset.2 In particular, the coe¢ cient on the lagged
dependent variable is biased towards one, while the short-run coe¢ cients of the
other variables are biased towards zero.
A typical aggregate Taylor rule takes the following form:
it = ￿ + ￿Et￿1 f￿t+h ￿ ￿￿g + ￿Et￿1 fxt+kg + ￿it￿1 + "t (1)
where the policy instrument, it, is a short-term interest rate, and (￿t ￿ ￿￿) and
xt represent deviations of in￿ ation and output from their reference values.
Before proceeding a word of caution is needed on the interpretation of our
estimates. It is not suggested that monetary policy in the United Kingdom
or any other country is in fact conducted by reference to such rules. Rather,
aggregate and individual versions of (1) are simply a convenient representation
of movements in the short-term interest rate.
As we are interested in individual heterogeneity, a more ￿ exible alternative to
the aggregate Taylor rule is a reaction function where parameters are allowed to
vary across members. If only the intercept changes with the N MPC members,
then we have a Fixed E⁄ect (FE) model, which with a slight abuse of notation
we write as follows:
ij;t = ￿j + ￿Et￿1 f￿t+h ￿ ￿￿g + ￿Et￿1 fxt+kg + ￿it￿1 + "j;t (2)
with j = 1;::N. If the in￿ ation and the output gap slopes are also member
speci￿c, then we have the Random Coe¢ cient (RC) speci￿cation:
ij;t = ￿j + ￿jEt￿1 f￿t+h ￿ ￿￿g + ￿jEt￿1 fxt+kg + ￿jit￿1 + ￿j;t (3)
For the remainder of the paper, we will assess the ability of individual reaction
2The sum of the autoregressive parameters in an AR(p) process, a widely-used measure of
persistence, is 0:83 for the in￿ation forecast and 0:86 for the output gap forecast, with p = 6.
4functions to capture heterogeneity in the voting patterns of MPC members.3
1.2 Estimates
In Table 1, we report estimates of the three speci￿cations using the Bank of
England forecasts for in￿ ation and output gap. The forecasts are based on the
constant interest rate projections reported in the In￿ation Report, a quarterly
publication issued by the Bank of England around the middle of each February,
May, August and November.4 We prefer to use constant as opposed to market-
based interest rates because the former are not in￿ uenced by the private sector
expectations on the future path of policy rates.
The parameters h and k are set respectively to 24 and 12 months. A two-
year horizon for in￿ ation is often referred to in the In￿ ation Report. And, a
one-year horizon for output is consistent with the extensive VAR evidence on the
lags of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (see for instance, Lawrence
Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans, 1999).
The historical data on individual interest rate votes are available on-line at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/mpcvoting.xls.5 The sample,
between the establishment of the MPC in May 1997 and July 2007, covers a
period of 122 meetings and 19 members for a total of 971 observations. We
consider only members with at least two years of experience on the MPC.6
3Although the speci￿cation is fairly general in the way it allows for heterogeneity between
committee members, we assume that the forecasts are held in common.
4The MPC meets at the beginning of the month and therefore the in￿ation forecast is
signed o⁄ after the monthly policy decision is taken. To avoid any possible endogeneity
between in￿ation forecasts and interest rate decisions, we assume that at the beginning of
each month t, policy makers observe only the forecasts available up to the end of the previous
month t ￿ 1. Data on the output gap forecast are con￿dential. The quarterly forecasts are
interpolated to obtain monthly series.
5Whenever not speci￿ed in the dataset, we assume that the magnitude of the individual
votes is 25 basis points.
6To capture any possible time trend, we augment the speci￿cations with a proxy for ex-
perience, measured as the number of months that each member has been on the MPC since
her/his ￿rst mandate. The estimates of the coe¢ cients on the proxy for experience are not
reported but they are available upon request. The current Governor ￿ s voting record is divided
into two time periods ￿before and after his appointment as Governor.
5Table 1 - Taylor rule estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aggregate FE AB RC RC
￿ 0.985*** 0.9877*** 0.9658*** 0.8954*** 0.8968***
(0.018) (0.0059) (0.005172) (0.01701) (0.0154)
￿ 0.333 0.4009*** 0.1509*** 0.3219*** 0.2399***
(0.200) (0.0439) (0.0415) (0.0594) (0.0617)
￿ -0.00289 -0.0065 -0.0071 -0.0140 -0.00811
(0.01845) (0.0045) (0.0096) (0.0205) (0.01633)
￿change 0.0757***
(0.0188)
￿ 0.0489 0.0076 -0.00003 0.5200*** 0.5027***
(0.0804) (0.0393) (0.00071) (0.1060) (0.0901)
Obs 122 971 952 971 971
# groups - 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In column 1, we report the estimates of the aggregate Taylor rule (1), while
in column 2 we show the estimates of the ￿xed-e⁄ects model (2).7 When the
time dimension is 30 and the cross-section 20, Judson and Owen (1999) shows
that the small-sample bias associated with the GMM estimator proposed by
Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond (1991) is similar in magnitude to the bias
of the FE model. For completeness, in column 3, we present the results for the
Arellano-Bond (AB) method using two lags of the variables as instruments for
the current values. In columns 4 and 5, we present the Swamy GLS random-
coe¢ cient estimates of model (3).
In the last column, the individual Taylor rules are augmented with a dummy
variable ￿ change￿taking values of one, zero and minus one depending on whether
the change in the policy rate in the previous meeting was upward, zero or
downward. Unlike the interest rate smoothing term, ij;t￿1, which captures the
individual persistence in the voting records, the variable change captures the
7The average time dimension of our unbalanced panel is 54 observations and we only
consider members who attended at least 24 consecutive meetings. This implies that the size
of the Nickell bias should be small (see Ruth Judson and Ann Owen, 1999).
6extent to which individual interest rate decisions depend on the past interest
rate decision of the committee as a whole.8 Testing for internal versus external
smoothing is a further advantage of the RC speci￿cation.
A number of interesting results emerge from Table 1. First, consistent with
the analytical results in Pesaran and Smith (1995) on the biases of pooled regres-
sion estimates in dynamic heterogeneous panels, the coe¢ cient on the lagged
dependent variable is signi￿cantly lower using the RC model.9 Second, the in-
￿ ation forecast has most explanatory power in the FE and RC speci￿cations,
suggesting that an e¢ cient use of the cross-section information yields more ac-
curate estimates.10 Third, the estimate of ￿ based on the RC speci￿cation in
column 4 is signi￿cantly higher than the estimate based on the Arellano-Bond
method in column 3.
The coe¢ cient on the output gap is always negative, thought it is never
statistically di⁄erent from zero.11 The intercept is statistically signi￿cant at
the 1% con￿dence level only in the RC columns, suggesting that the pooled
estimates may be biased towards zero. The null of parameter constancy is
strongly rejected in the estimation of the random coe¢ cient models.
The estimate of ￿change is highly signi￿cant, implying that after a policy
change dissenters have a tendency towards voting in line with the rest of the
committee. A comparison with the estimates of ￿ in column 5, however, reveals
8Drawing a parallelism from habits in the consumption literature, we will refer to internal
or external smoothing depending on whether individual decisions depend on the individual or
aggregate lagged interest rate.
9As the in￿ation and output gaps are stationary variables, both in the theory and in the
data, the apparent near-unit root in the nominal interest rate is likely due to the small sample.
10We also experiment with a more general speci￿cation in which individual members are
allowed, but not required, to respond to both current in￿ation and the in￿ation forecast. The
parameter on current in￿ation is not statistically di⁄erent from zero, and the parameter on
the in￿ation forecast is virtually identical to the estimates in Table 1.
11It should be noted that the estimates of ￿ do not imply that the output gap is irrelevant
for the policy decision. Rather, they imply that the output gap is not a target per sŁ and is
important only to the extent it helps to forecast future in￿ation. Using HP ￿ltered real GDP,
we ￿nd some evidence of a signi￿cant response to output but the magnitude of the coe¢ cient
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LONG-RUN COEFFICIENT ON OUTPUT GAP
Non-Academic Academic
Figure 1: Con￿dence bands for long-run coe¢ cients in individual Taylor rules
that internal smoothing is far more important than external smoothing.
In Figure 1, we plot 90% con￿dence intervals for the estimates of the indi-
vidual parameters behind the RC results in column 5. The long-run coe¢ cients
are computed as ￿j=(1￿￿j), ￿j=(1￿￿j) and ￿j=(1￿￿j), and they capture the
(preferred) long-run level of the real interest rate and the cumulated responses
of the nominal interest rate to a 1% deviation of in￿ ation and output from the
reference values. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
In each column, the 19 estimates of the individual long-run coe¢ cients are
reported three times, according to alternative group splits. The dashed lines
refer to members appointed as internal (￿rst row), members with working expe-
8rience in the Treasury prior to the appointment (second row) and members with
working experience in academia prior to the appointment (third row). To pre-
serve anonymity in the individual regressions, numbers are randomly assigned
to MPC members within each group and across columns.
The main conclusion we draw from Figure 1 and formal hypothesis testing
is that there is little evidence that the heterogeneity reported in Table 1 be as-
sociated with the three types of heterogeneity that we have considered.12 More-
over, inspection of the panels in the middle column reveals that the long-run
responses to the in￿ ation gap are fairly homogenous, independent of the group
split. Altogether, our results suggest that individual (unobserved) characteris-
tics di⁄erent from belonging to the groups ￿ internal￿ , ￿ treasury￿and ￿ academia￿
are responsible for the heterogeneity in the MPC voting patterns.
2 Conclusions
The results presented here do suggest evidence of heterogeneity in the decisions
made at the Bank of England MPC. However, the reactions to the forecasts of
in￿ ation and output gap appear fairly homogenous with no signi￿cant di⁄er-
ences between members according to their internal/external status, academic
background or experience working in the Treasury. Our estimates suggest that
in￿ ation forecasts generally predict the behavior of all committee members. But,
there is less consistent evidence of responses to the forecasts of the output gap.
While these forecasts are ultimately the responsibility of the MPC, they re￿ ect
a collective process involving the input of Bank sta⁄. The ￿ndings reinforce the
role that such forecasting can play in shaping policy decisions.
12Wald tests fail to reject the null-hypothesis of parameter constacy across the GLS mean
group estimates for all pairs of long-run coe¢ cients but the intercepts of the treasury/non-
treasury classi￿cation at the 5% con￿dence level and the output gap coe¢ cients of the
academics/non-academics classi￿cation at the 1% con￿dence level.
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